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Abstract 
The construction industry is important for Chinese rural to urban migrants. Over 90% 
of urban construction workers are rural migrants, and over a third of all rural migrants 
work in construction. The construction industry is not only particularly important, but 
is also different from other industries in its pay and labour recruitment practices. In 
common with other rural workers, construction workers have long suffered from 
various problems, including delayed payment of salaries and exclusion from urban 
social security schemes. State policies designed to deal with these problems have in 
general had mixed success. Partly as a result of the peculiarities of the construction 
industry, state policy has been particularly unsuccessful in dealing with the problems 
faced by construction workers.  
 
This paper considers both the risks rural workers in the construction industry face 
because of the work they do and the risks they face and because of their being rural 
workers. It shows that social protection needs to take into account both the work 
related risks and status related risks. The authors first review the literature concerning 
work related risks, and then build up a framework to analyse the risks embedded in 
their work and status, and the relationship between these risks and the existing formal 
social protection. Thirty one in depth interviews with construction workers, carried 
out in Tianjin, PRC, are used to demonstrate both the risks and the inability of the 
state-led social policy to tackle these risks. The results suggest that rural construction 
workers in cities were exposed to all sorts of problems from not being paid for their 
work in time to miserable living conditions, from having to pay for their own 
healthcare to no savings for old age. This paper highlights the problems of policy 
prescriptions that failed to recognise the complexity of the problems faced by these 
workers and criticises the tendency to seek quick fixes rather than long-term and 
careful institutional design. 
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Introduction  
Numerous studies have been carried out on the circumstances of workers from rural 
areas in urban China (Guang, 2005; He et al., 2005; Sun, 2003; Solinger, 1999; Shen 
and Huang, 2003; Li, 2005). Construction workers are mostly studied together with 
workers from other industries and seldom treated as an individual group. However, 
there are good reasons to study the construction industry separately. First, the 
construction industry is particularly important to the Chinese economy. It has been 
growing steadily for more than 25 years (Figure 1), and the number of people 
employed in construction shows long term growth (Figure 2). About one third of all 
rural workers in cities work in construction (Ministry of Construction and All China 
Federation of Trade Unions, 2006), and it forms a growing share in the employment 
portfolio of growing numbers of rural workers (Figure 3 and Table 1). Second, it is an 
industry dominated by rural workers, which comprise over 90 per cent of urban 
construction workers.1 Finally, as will be shown later, workers in the construction 
industry in China are different from workers in other industries because of the way 
labour recruitment and pay is organised.  
 
This paper considers both the risks rural workers in the construction industry face 
because of the work they do and the risks they face and because of their being rural 
workers. It shows that social protection needs to take into account of both the work 
related risks and status related risks. The authors first review the literature concerning 
work related risks, and then build up a framework to analyse the risks embedded in 
their work and status, and the relationship between the risks and the existing social 
protection system.  
 
Literature review 
The changes in the nature of work that lead to incompatible social security protection 
have caught the attention of researchers on both developed and developing countries.  
 
In developed countries, where many welfare services have become rights for all 
citizens, the discussion is largely based on the rigid social welfare system’s inability 
to cope with the increasingly flexible working pattern (Perrons, 1999; Lazear, 1990; 
Pacelli, 2002; Dolado et al., 2002; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994) which creates 
disincentives to labour market participation (Maloney, 1997; Carling et al., 2000; 
Richardson, 1999), or lowers employers’ willingness to hire workers (Jackman et al., 
1996; Maloney, 1997; Richardson, 1999). Such mismatch results in reduced 
motivation to work, or increased difficulty to find work. 
 
In developing countries, where many welfare rights are not yet universal, the 
discussion is more about the inability of the state to provide social protection to 
                                              
1  They are also called rural-urban migrants, floating population in the related literature 
depending whether their stay in cities is long term or temporary. 
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certain social groups (Li, 2004; Rabi et al., 1998; Buchanan et al., 2006), especially 
people working under flexible arrangements or in the informal sector (Lund and 
Srinivas, 2000; Li, 2006b; Bernabé, 2002; Wesseling et al., 2002; van Ginneken, 
1999). An increasingly important issue is the lack of social protection for people 
moving from the traditional agricultural sector to urban industries to find jobs (Li, 
2005; Overbye, 2005; Robson, 1954) or working informally (Li, 2006b; Pisani and 
Pagan, 2004; Koo and Smith, 1983; Bigsten et al., 2004; Gallin, 2001). The rural-
urban and the formal-informal divisions in social security leave a large proportion of 
the labour force exposed to high risks (Leung, 2006; Sirovatka and Mares, 2006; Li 
and Piachaud, 2006; Loewe, 2004; Knezevic and Butler, 2003; Micklewright and 
Marnie, 2005; Tang and Ngan, 2001; van Ginneken, 1999). The option of not working 
is not viable, and so the mismatch is manifested instead in workers taking up 
unprotected jobs with few or no elements of social security. 
 
The key issue is the mismatch between social protection and the changes in the world 
of work. There are different prescriptions to solve the problems resulting from the 
mismatch in developing and developed countries. In the former, innovative policies 
are designed to help people participate more effectively in the labour market (Hudson, 
2002), or make the social security system more employment friendly, as in 
“flexicurity” --- a framework for flexibility-security (Ferrera et al., 2001; Wilthagen 
and Tros, 2004), that aims to make social security more compatible with changing 
employment patterns.  
 
In developing countries, extension of social citizenship to some excluded social 
groups has been a predominant theme in the study of social protection (Cook et al., 
2003). Also, the role of self-financed and self-managed social security schemes, often 
closely associated with the activities of the NGOs and international organisations, and 
area based new initiatives, involving collaboration between local governments and  “a 
wide variety of possible social security partnerships”, are recognised to be 
complementary to the formal system (van Ginneken, 1999). 
 
The literature on the inability to extend formal social protection schemes to certain 
social groups in China has been quick to blame poor policy implementation resulting 
from local resistance: a combination of local protectionism and lack of understanding 
of the necessity to extend social protection (Zhang, 2005; Zhang, 2004; Research 
Team from Labour Science Research Institute, 2004; Wang, 2001). Reasons that make 
it difficult to implement these policies are rarely explored. The Central Government 
frequently publishes mandates that call for the “deepening”, “improving”, and 
“strengthening” of various reforms and policies it issued in the past without 
questioning why they have failed. 
 
However, increasing attention has been given to the mismatch between various social 
policies and the social groups targeted. For example, Hu (2005) pointed to an ill 
designed poverty relief policy that failed to meet the needs of the rural poor. As a 
result, poverty could not be reduced even with good local government 
implementation. Similarly, Tang and Wang (2002) studied the design of the urban 
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minimum income guarantee, and criticised it for inappropriate design. Shi (2002) 
examined how women were in effect excluded in a policy environment that explicitly 
forbade discrimination against women.  
 
In this paper, we explore the limits to relying solely on formal social protection 
schemes to tackle the vulnerability of construction workers from rural areas. It 
addresses the problems that lie in the organisation of the industry itself, and the 
problems associated with the formal social security. 
 
Introducing work related risks into the research of rural construction 
workers in Chinese cities 
We suggest that work related problems need to be considered when examining the 
social protection of rural construction workers in urban China. These workers are 
vulnerable not only because they are rural workers who do not enjoy the same equal 
social protection as their urban counterparts, as shown in many previous studies. They 
are vulnerable also because they work in the construction industry which brings with 
it a set of risks that are particularly serious for construction workers. They are also 
migrants who are not yet fully integrated into urban life and keep distinctive life-
styles. Therefore, even if the state policy intends to extend the formal social security 
schemes to these workers, a combination of work related risks, and social risks and 
personal understanding of the risks, often expressed with their status as rural-urban 
migrants, may lead to the failure of a simple extension of social security. To 
understand the challenges better, it is important to distinguish work related and status 
related risks that affect the livelihoods of these workers.  
 
Work related risks  
 
The labour supply in the construction industry is managed through the labour 
subcontractor system. Construction companies do not hire frontline workers directly, 
and instead sign contracts with labour subcontractors. These subcontractors are 
themselves workers from rural areas, who came to cities early, became familiar with 
the system, and started working as labour subcontractors. They are responsible for 
recruiting and supplying workers to construction companies. For many years, 
subcontractors were de facto agents of construction workers. Construction companies 
pay subcontractors, who then distribute the money to workers at the end of the project 
or once every year. The subcontractors themselves are paid either in instalments or 
after a project is completed (Lu and Fox, 2001). 
 
Subcontractors have played a key role in China’s construction industry, based on their 
information advantage over both urban construction companies and rural workers. 
Subcontractors know where to recruit large groups of cheap labour, and can use their 
kinship and friendship networks to recruit people quickly. When there is labour 
shortage on site, which is often the case during booming periods, they can go back to 
their home villages or counties to persuade people to come to cities. They are thus 
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much more effective than urban construction companies can be on their own. On the 
other hand, subcontractors know more than other ex-farmers which construction 
projects are in need of workers, and have a strong bargaining power vis-à-vis rural 
workers. Workers rely on these labour subcontractors. Experienced subcontractors can 
have hundreds of workers working for them over many years (Xiao and Liu, 2005).  
 
Labour subcontractors thus are crucial in the life of frontline construction workers 
from rural areas. Labour subcontractors can decide at discretion who to hire, how and 
when workers are paid, how and when workers should work. Workers trust the labour 
subcontractors. “Good” subcontractors guard the interests of their workers. However, 
subcontractors are profit driven individuals. Their profit seeking activities or any 
unexpected problems on the side of the subcontractors may hurt the workers.  
 
This system is largely based on “trust” (Guang, 2005). Labour subcontractors are 
often relatives or fellow villagers of the recruited workers. It is very common that 
workers do not sign any contracts either with subcontractors or with construction 
companies. Workers only have oral agreements with their labour subcontractors(China 
Construction Daily, 07-12-2004). The current labour subcontract system has several 
inherited problems which can be potentially problematic for construction workers: 
 
First, it is widely reported that labour subcontractors often failed to pay for the work 
of rural workers at the end of the projects. This can be for various reasons.  
 
? Some subcontractors deliberately hold the money for a long time to earn interest. 
When a subcontractor mainly hires workers from his home village or county, he is 
more likely to behave in a more responsible way, as he has to face the pressure 
back at home. Late or missing pay is more frequent when a subcontractor hires 
people from outside his home county.  
 
? There is a chain of delayed pay in the construction industry. The owner of a project 
only pays for the work of construction companies after the project starts and 
sometimes only after the project completes. The construction companies would 
then hold the money to supplement shortage in working capital. Workers need to 
wait even longer to get paid. When there are serious disputes, the hope of getting 
paid in time will be even less (Erickson et al., 2003; Beijing Urban Household 
Survey Team, 2003; Fong and Murphy, 2005).  
 
? Even if subcontractors have received the money, they are not willing to pay the 
workers in full straightaway, mainly to make sure that workers will not leave the 
project before it is finished. In this way, workers are rarely fully paid for their 
work before the end of the project. Before the final pay, labour subcontractors give 
workers a small amount of money to cover their living expenses (Lu and Fox, 
2001; Sha and Jiang, 2003). 
 
Second, workers are exposed to frequent unemployment. Construction workers are 
hired on a per project basis. A subcontractor may not always be able to sign up for a 
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new project, and projects can be at different parts of the country. At the end of each 
project, the team of frontline workers is dismissed. Some workers follow the 
subcontractors to a different project or even to a different place. Some workers have to 
find new employers. Even workers who team up with certain subcontractors for a long 
time are not guaranteed future employment. The job is thus of transitory nature (Lu 
and Fox, 2001; Xiao and Liu, 2005). 
 
Third, another work related risk is injuries. Construction work involves hard labour 
and operation of heavy equipment. Industrial accidents are frequent, especially among 
poorly trained and inexperienced workers(Kisner and Fosbroke, 1994). Workers who 
come to cities for the first time rarely have any training before they start on a 
construction site, and are thus in particular risk of accidents. Another cause of injury 
is operation in dangerous weather. Quite often, construction companies need to meet 
deadlines or cut costs of labour protection. Workers are forced to work under unsafe 
conditions unaware of the danger of such conditions(Fan, 2004; Xia et al., 2000).  
 
Status related risks 
 
Status related risks can be left unprotected by exclusive social policy and self-
exclusive behaviour.  
 
As discussed in many previous studies, for many years, rural-urban migrants could not 
live like other urban citizens. There has been a household registration system 
(Hukou), within which people were labelled with their place of origin. People from 
cities had urban Hukou, and people from rural areas had rural Hukou. The state 
controlled labour mobility by preventing people without urban Hukou moving to 
cities, and used this system to limit their entitlement to urban social welfare (Li, 2005; 
Fong and Murphy, 2005; Solinger, 1999; Li, 2006a). Starting from the late 1990s, the 
state decided to reduce this level of social control and grant rural workers the right to 
live and work in cities. Therefore, the role of the Hukou system to control labour has 
largely been removed. However, free entry to cities does not mean equal treatment. 
Rural workers are not yet entitled to many social rights that are available to urban 
residents. 
 
This is not only a problem caused by the exclusive urban system. It is also related to 
the fact that workers from rural areas tend to move back and forth between the city 
and the village. They go back to the countryside when they cannot continue in cities. 
The lack of identification with the urban society among rural-urban migrants can 
potentially generate a major problem for the extension of formal social security: a low 
participation rate in the urban welfare system and continued reliance on rural social 
security, which is still largely distinctive from the urban system. This kind of self-
exclusive behaviour is often criticised for its short-sightedness. After staying in cities 
for many years, some workers find it difficult to resettle in the countryside. In 
particular, many young people are unwilling to return to villages (Li, 2006a). Many 
farmers from peri-urban areas have lost their land after they abandoned farming for 
some years, so they do not have any choice but to stay in cities (Li, 2006a; Gar-On 
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Yeh and Li, 1999; Skinner et al., 2001). But the inactive participation is 
understandable if we consider that they had rarely been exposed to the risks of urban 
life before. 
 
In summary, work, exclusive policy and self exclusive behaviour all contribute to the 
high risks faced by rural-urban migrants in the construction industry (See Figure 4 for 
an illustration of how these elements work in the construction industry.).  
 
Policies addressing the risks 
In the late 1990s, the Chinese government started to engage in the improvement of 
labour protection for workers from rural areas. Some policies were also designed to 
target construction workers specifically. 
 
Policies targeting status related risks 
 
In 2004, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security published “Suggestions on 
Urging Employees Working in Enterprises of Mixed Ownership and Non-State 
Owned Economic Organisations to Participate in Health Insurance (guanyu tuijin 
hunhe suoyouzhi qiye he feigongyouzhi jingji zuzhi congye renyuan canjia yiliao 
baoxin de yijian)”(Ministry of Labour and Social Security PRC, 2004). This document 
explicitly requires employers to contribute to social insurance of healthcare for 
workers from rural areas, in the same way as they contribute for urban employees. 
This document asks the Labour and Social Security Departments at the provincial 
level to design their own contribution rates and schemes so that workers suffering 
from major illnesses can be insured. 
 
Apart from these national level regulations, there are various local regulations which 
try to cover workers from rural areas within the social insurance system. In Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou employers were required to contribute to social insurance 
schemes to help rural workers to receive pensions in the future. Also, local schemes 
were designed to protect workers construction workers against injuries caused either 
by industrial accident or by unforeseeable causes at work, serious illnesses, and 
unemployment.  
 
Policies targeting work related risks 
 
The State Council, following a mandate in 2001 to keep order in the construction 
market and reduce delayed pay to workers (Office of the State Council PRC, 2001), 
published “The Notice from the Office of the State Council to Effectively Solve the 
Problem of Delayed Pay in Construction Projects”, calling for all government 
departments, unions and social groups to help clear the delayed pay in the 
construction industry (Office of the State Council PRC, 2003).  
 
In 2003, the State Council of China issued “The Regulations on Social Insurance 
against Industrial Accidents” (Gongshang baoxian tiaoli), which requires employers to 
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contribute to a socialised industrial accident fund. The rate of contribution is decided 
according to the overall risk level of the industry (State Council, 2003). Once an 
accident happens, the employer should cooperate with the local government offices to 
check the injury and estimate the costs of healthcare, medication, food, salary and 
relevant welfare benefits to be paid by the social insurance fund. The regulation 
further set the compensation for various circumstances, including not being able to go 
back to work for more than twelve months, disability and death.  
 
In 2003, the Ministry of Construction issued “Guidelines on Improving Insurance 
against Unforeseeable Injuries in the Construction Sector” (Guanyu jiaqiang jianzhu 
yiwai shanghai baoxian gongzuo de zhidao yijian), which included a compulsory 
contribution by employers to social insurance schemes against unforeseeable injuries, 
such as injuries caused by flying objects (Ministry of Construction PRC, 2003). 
 
More recently, a suggestion made by the Central Government (Ministry of 
Construction PRC, 2005) acknowledged the problems associated with the labour 
subcontractor system. From July 1 2005 all the labour subcontractors were to be 
replaced with formally registered urban companies. These companies will then sign 
formal contracts with workers, and be responsible for their welfare. In case of dispute 
workers will be able to file formal complaints, and it will be much easier for the state 
to protect the interests of workers. In addition, large scale professional labour 
companies have a pool of projects in a specific area, which will help to reduce the 
unorganised labour flow. 
 
Among these changes, there are polices addressing some of the direct causes of risks: 
lack of social insurance coverage, higher rate of accidents and removal of labour 
subcontractor system. Apparently, the state intended to improve the circumstances of 
rural construction workers in cities. Will these targeted measures solve the problems? 
The policies that address the work related risks treat the labour subcontractors and the 
incomplete coverage of the state provided social protection as the root causes for the 
risks that rural-urban migrant construction workers face. Following this logic, 
extending the existing state protection and removal of labour subcontractors will be 
effective.  
 
The case of Tianjin 
To see whether these policies had been able to solve the problems, the authors of this 
paper carried out in-depth interviews with construction workers in Tianjin in 2005 to 
see how the reforms in the last several years have affected their circumstances.  
 
Tianjin is one of the four metropolitan cities directly controlled by the Central 
Government. It has become an important destination for rural-urban migrant workers 
in North China (Lu and Fox, 2001). More recently, the Olympic Games in Beijing in 
2008 made Tianjin, 120 kilometres southeast of Beijing, a hot spot for real estate 
development. Workers from all over the country now flow into Tianjin to work on 
construction sites. 
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Thirty-five interviews were started, of which thirty-one were completed. Interviewees 
were chosen among frontline workers or labourers on site, based on an earlier survey 
of 300 rural workers from various industries in Tianjin. The interviewees were poor 
before they came to Tianjin. We could not gain access to all qualified interviewees 
because of inconvenient working schedules, lack of response, or unwillingness to be 
interviewed. Because of the small scale of this particular research, it is difficult to 
generalise the research findings quantitatively. However, our intention was to examine 
whether the reforms had effectively addressed work and status related risks. By 
making ourselves aware of the historical policy changes and previous studies on how 
the industry works, we are confident that our interviews captured the crucial risks we 
were interested in.  
 
The interviewees were fully informed of the context of research, and participation was 
voluntary. They came from five construction sites in Tianjin: Tianjin Madison Square 
project (including a hotel, an eighteen-storey apartment building, a department store 
and parking space), Wangdingdi Housing Regeneration Building No. 1 and No. 2. 
(two housing projects with eighteen-storey above ground housing and a one-storey 
basement), Tianjin Sunshine 100 International New City (a high rise building 
including a department store, offices, and commercial flats (Floor 9-11), and an 
equipment room and a bicycle parking lot in the basement), Nankai University 
Student Centre (a building of offices and function rooms), China Railway No. 16 
Bureau (an office building).  
 
The interviews were in semi-structured schedules. The questions included three main 
elements: (1) personal information, (2) work related and status related risks, and (3) 
help from the state and participation in social security schemes. In addition, 
interviewees were able to elaborate on their answers, and interviewers could ask 
follow-up questions. Each interview lasted for about one hour. The interviews were 
recorded and later transcribed. Interviewees are referred to by alphanumerical labels to 
preserve anonymity. 
 
The thirty-one interviewees came from ten provinces. Three were women, and twenty 
eight were men in accordance with the gender distribution in construction. Most men 
were frontline workers, such as carpenters, scaffolders, ironworkers, wielders, crane 
operators, glass workers and builders. Some undertook miscellaneous tasks on site. 
The three women were on-site cooks for the frontline workers. The average age of 
interviewees was thirty-eight. This is higher than the average age for all construction 
workers from rural areas, as we deliberately chose workers who were in poverty 
before they came to cities. While older workers came to cities mainly to escape 
poverty, younger workers often came because of a desire to become urbanised (Li, 
2006a). Twenty-six interviewees were married, three single, and two divorced. In 
terms of education, four did not finish primary school education, eleven finished 
primary school, twelve completed secondary school, and four graduated from high 
school.  
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The interviewees came from ten provinces. One third of them only came to Tianjin in 
2005 but worked in other parts of China before. Among the other two thirds who 
stayed in Tianjin for more than one year, most had worked in other cities before they 
came to Tianjin. Some workers also travel between cities and the countryside, 
sometimes because of lack of employment opportunities, and sometimes because of 
their own decision to leave, either temporary or permanently. In many cases, workers 
never completely abandon rural life. They only come to cities to earn cash when not 
busy in agriculture. 
 
Work related risks 
 
No contract 
 
In all the construction sites we investigated, subcontractors, often called “the boss” by 
our interviewees, determined who to hire. They used favouritism and nepotism, 
largely based on social distance. Family members had priority, followed by relatives, 
fellow villagers, friends from outside the village but in the same county, etc. This 
could change over time, however. As subcontractors stayed longer in cities, they 
became more willing to hire people from other parts of the country. The recent urban 
construction boom made it easier for workers without any connections to find a job, 
especially during the harvest season when many workers returned to their villages. 
Therefore, there were cases when workers did not have any “acquaintances” on site. 
LL1: “Skills do not matter much for this kind of work. If a construction 
project starts and you do not know anyone there, no matter how skilful 
you are, no one will hire you. Most people rely on acquaintances. We all 
need to count on people we know. The more people you know, the 
easier it is to find work.” 
ZHJW2: “I came to Tianjin to work for a job introduced by a friend. 
Unfortunately, it did not work out. I did not know any other people and 
became jobless for more than six months. I spent all my savings and 
finally got an offer to work on this construction site. But I can only work 
here for two months…. I did not realise that it would be so difficult to 
find a job.”  
 
Workers were often reluctant to demand a formalised working relationship, mostly 
regarding a contract unnecessary and sometimes out of consideration for their 
personal relationship with the “boss”. 
LL1: “We do not sign any contract. None of us here signed a contract. If 
any thing goes wrong, for example, some one seriously injured, they 
(the construction company and the boss) will take care of us. There is no 
                                              
2  This is the code used to replace the name of an interviewee. Similar codes will be used for 
other interviewees. 
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use signing contracts….The bosses understand but we do not, and we do 
not have the energy to understand…. I have not signed any contract.”  
Routinely and unexpectedly delayed pay 
 
Our interviews identified two methods of pay. One method was a monthly living 
allowance of 300-500 Yuan plus end-of-year full pay. The pay was calculated 
according to number of days a worker had worked. The other method was monthly 
pay based on informal arrangement oral agreement. It only happens in very special 
cases. This happened to one of our interviewees, ZHJW, who did not trust the 
employer and negotiated monthly payments. The salary with this kind of arrangement 
was fixed, 800-1500 RMB Yuan per month depending on the type of work.  
ZHJZ：“…depending on how much I work. If I have more work to do, I 
earn more. We cannot get all the money every month. The full amount 
can only be calculated at the end of the year.” 
KY1: “In some occasions, for example when family members become 
ill, the kids need to pay school fees at the beginning of a term, or the 
harvest time back at home, our boss will give each of us an extra of 200 
Yuan each month.” 
ZHJC: “The biggest problem I had come across was that I worked for a 
boss for a whole year. Before the New Year, he left and we were not 
paid. Luckily, we found him one year later. But I only got the money at 
the end of the second year. I worked so hard for one year and it took me 
another two years to get paid for my work. That was the toughest time in 
my life. “ 
 
Injuries at work 
 
If a project was delayed, the subcontractor would face difficulty getting full pay, and 
so had incentives to push the workers to work even in poor weather. Most of our 
interviewees had worked in dangerous weather conditions.  
KY1: “When there is not enough work for you to do and it rains, they 
will ask you to stop. If there is a lot of work to do, even if it is in thunder 
storm, we have to work.” 
KY2: “There is no compensation if you suffer from heatstroke or catch a 
cold. If you cannot work the next day, you will not be paid. If you have 
to see the doctor and if there is penalty for delay, you have to bear the 
costs.” 
 
According to regulations, in case of major injury, construction companies have to pay 
for healthcare and loss of salary during the recovery period. However, this does not 
mean that workers do not need to worry about the costs of injuries. 
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ZJC: “If there are injuries on site and the costs are less than 1000 Yuan, 
we have to pay by ourselves. If there are small expenses, 20 Yuan today 
and 20 Yuan tomorrow, we will have to pay on our own. If your finger 
is broken and you have to go to hospital, and the costs are more than 
1000 Yuan, the boss has to pay. Workers usually know to claim this 
back. We only earn 1000 Yuan per month. If we have to pay 1000 Yuan 
for injuries, we will not be able to live. It is just so straightforward.” 
ZJW: “People in our group (the group for miscellaneous tasks) rarely 
suffer from major injuries. My boss is nice. He pays for part of the small 
costs. If I spend 100 Yuan, he will pay 70. That is the best he can do. If I 
have to rest for 10 days because of the injury, he will not pay me 
anything.” 
 
Frequent unemployment 
 
Whether workers could find the next project is largely dependent on labour 
subcontractors and their social network. Unless the same subcontractor could offer 
anther project to continue, it was unavoidable that a worker became unemployed for a 
while before he or she could find another project. This was largely due to the intensity 
of the jobs, which demanded full devotion during the construction period. It was 
almost not possible for a person to start looking for another project before the 
previous one ended. Nevertheless, as the construction industry had been expanding 
rapidly in Tianjin since 2000, it was relatively easy for workers to find jobs at the time 
of the interviews. The interviewees of this research were mostly optimistic about 
getting other jobs after this one. However, workers who had stayed in cities for a 
longer time still remembered more difficult times: 
ZHJ: “For a while, in 1998, it was very difficult to find a job in 
construction. You had to know the right people. New workers had to be 
introduced by older workers…. The older workers were your relatives. 
Or you had to be exceptionally skilled. Since 2001, construction became 
prosperous again. Many bosses cannot find enough workers. Now every 
company is in shortage of workers. All bosses are willing to hire 
people.”  
 
Status related risks 
 
None of our interviewees were permanent urban residents. They still have limited 
access to social protection benefits available to permanent urban residents. 
 
Health problems 
 
Among the thirty-one interviewees, twenty-five reported that they were in good health 
and five reported that they were fairly healthy. Only one reported a minor but chronic 
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illness. This is related to the fact that construction work is physically demanding. 
Anyone on site has to be in good health.  
KY1: “We cannot afford to go to hospitals. Let me tell you, workers all 
think it is too expensive to go to hospital and take medicine. If we have 
minor illnesses, we never go to see the doctor. If we suffer from high 
fever, we just take some medicine on our own. If we have to go to 
nearby clinics to take intravenous injection, it is always nearly a hundred 
Yuan charge. If we need to go to large hospital…, it is simply 
unthinkable. “ 
 
Older age 
 
Construction workers were mostly quite young. This is partly because of physical 
demands. People who are old or not strong will not be able to stay. This is also 
because the construction industry is easier for new comers to enter. After all, the 
history of rural workers coming to cities is not very long. It was young people who 
first came to cities to work. As time moves on, those who were young ten or even 
twenty years ago are no longer young. Many of them still work in cities. Some even 
remain in construction. Three of our interviewees were in their 50s and eleven in their 
40s.  
 
Their current circumstances 
 
By the time of the interviews in October 2005, the deadline for removing labour 
subcontractors had passed. The workers in Tianjin were still working under the labour 
subcontractors and were not aware of the potential changes. Are there any 
improvements in terms of social protection? We focused on participation in social 
insurance schemes, and the problem of delayed salary pay. 
 
Workers still have difficulties getting their pay 
 
The state made it clear that workers should be fully paid, and that employers will be 
punished if they failed to do so. However, the implementation of the policy could only 
be successful if workers had signed contracts with their employers, or at least were 
able to bring evidence to prove the existence of employment relationship. However, as 
shown earlier, workers in Tianjin still failed to sign contracts. They had only verbal 
agreements with labour subcontractors. It was not uncommon that workers could not 
even name the construction companies they worked for. Many of them only knew 
their labour subcontractors. When the subcontractors defaulted or ran away, workers 
had difficulty showing evidence of their work. What was more, since projects owners, 
construction companies and the labour subcontractors often came from different parts 
of the country, the local government did not necessarily have the incentives or even 
the ability to chase them. As a result, delayed or missing pay remained a serious 
problem in this industry and was difficult to solve.  
 13
LL3: “I went to the government once. They told us to go to the 
Construction Bureau and gave us the address. When we arrived (at the 
Construction Bureau), the officer asked whose project we had worked 
for. We said the project of Bureau Six. They said: ‘You should go to ask 
them.’ We told them we went to Bureau Six before. It was in Tanggu 
District. The officer asked: ‘Where was your project located?’ I told him 
Tianjin University. The officer said: ‘It is in Nankai District. You should 
go to the office there.’ When we went to the Nankai District 
government, the officer said: ‘You should go to Bureau Six’. What’s the 
point? They are useless.” 
 
Workers have not participated in social insurance schemes 
 
Workers from rural areas suffer from many risks such as health problems, old age and 
unemployment. The urban social insurance system is designed to address these risks. 
However, as shown earlier, construction workers’ risks are related to the organisation 
of the industry. Various social policies are designed to protect workers from these 
risks. Are they successful? 
 
Apart from industrial injury which is covered by construction companies, all other 
social insurance schemes involve workers’ contributions. So far, workers still have 
difficulties getting their salaries paid in time and in full. The last thing they want is a 
further deduction. Therefore, they are more than willing to avoid contributing to 
insurance schemes. However, money was not the only issues that concerned workers. 
There were various reasons behind the unwillingness to join the social insurance 
schemes.  
 
Our interviews showed that many interviewees, who spoke with resentment about 
social insurance, were aware that social insurance could be helpful for them to guard 
against risks. Nonetheless, they also understood that the existing policy did not take 
care of their needs and they were not really treated equally.  
ZHJW: “People in cities buy insurance. I have seen on TV. They have 
stable income. We do not. This lucky year brought in more money. 
When we were not lucky, our income was low. Urban people work for 
big enterprises. They get guaranteed salaries and the insurance 
contribution is on top of their salaries. We need to pay out of our own 
pocket. We do not have the extra money. We cannot retire. We just 
work until we are old. When we are too old to work, we just wait to 
die.” 
 
Urban healthcare is no longer fully funded by the state. Since the late 1990s, there 
have been major efforts to develop a healthcare system which is funded by social and 
private insurance, and to develop community healthcare system. The social insurance 
system is based on employers and employees’ joint contributions. So far, the coverage 
is not universal. Different types of employers, different regions and even enterprises 
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within the same industry have different policies towards what to cover and who to 
cover. The state requires employers to contribute for rural workers in the same ways 
as they do for urban residents. It has so far not been well accepted by both the 
employers and the rural workers. It seems that the segregated healthcare system is not 
able to cope with other workers from rural areas, not to mention construction workers 
who move much more frequently than other workers. 
What is more, the rural healthcare system is based a cooperative healthcare system 
which should in theory offer primary healthcare to nearly 90 percent of the population. 
It has collapsed as the ability of rural collectives to raise funds for healthcare fell 
under the influence of household responsibility system. Hospitals in towns and 
counties depend less on public funding and more on private payments (Li and 
Piachaud, 2006).  
ZHJH:”It is not about money. When we are ill, we cannot stay here 
anymore. Who will take care of us if we are ill? We cannot expect our 
family members to come here to look after us. If we have minor 
problems or have to get intravenous injections, there is no need for 
others to help. In the worst case, some fellow workers can help out. If it 
is serious illness, I just go home straightaway. So we do not really need 
healthcare from the city. “ 
 
Similarly, social insurance against unemployment also depends on workers 
contribution. However, there is no effective mechanism to allow workers to move 
from one place to another. The current system also does not take into account of the 
possibility that workers may go back to their villages if they lose their jobs, therefore 
workers may simply lose the money they contributed if they go back to their 
hometown. This seems to be a major concern of the workers we interviewed in 
Tianjin. 
LL3: “We do not stay at one place. We move a lot. We do not settle 
down permanently. I do not even know where I am going to be next 
year. How can I pay for insurance here?” 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
As discussed by Duffy (1998) in his report on social exclusion in Europe, social 
policy itself cannot offer sufficient protection for disadvantaged groups. It is 
important to have a holistic approach which tackles the different factors that affects 
human development. Along similar lines, the ILO has been advocating the idea of 
‘decent work’:  
“It involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair 
income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, 
better prospects for personal development and social integration, 
freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in 
the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and 
treatment for all women and men.” (ILO, 2006) 
 15
Our research suggests that construction workers in China do not meet such standards 
for decent work and social protection. The labour subcontractor system contributes to 
the high risks workers face in the construction industry specifically. Trust without 
contract makes it difficult to be sure workers will be paid on time, or at all, or have 
any chance of compensation for damages.  It is also related to frequent 
unemployment, which in turn affects the ability of workers to file complaints and be 
effectively protected. Jobs in construction also bring along high risks of injuries, 
especially when health and safety standards are not met. 
 
In terms of claiming unpaid salaries, the labour subcontractor system also creates 
difficulties for those trying to implement policies to improve worker securities. The 
problems seemed to have disappeared temporarily after the state policy to fight 
against delayed pay was put in place. However, even in the construction industry (Li, 
2006a), which was a major target for this policy, delayed or unpaid salaries seemed to 
have returned. Many researchers called for more creative methods to protect the 
workers, and criticised the state for not offering equal treatment to workers from rural 
areas. However, as shown in this research, the problems faced by these workers result 
from the organisation of the industry.  
 
Removing the labour subcontractor system was exactly what the Ministry of 
Construction’s 2005 requirements were meant to do. However, such a policy failed to 
recognise the fact that the labour subcontractor system is playing a crucial role in the 
labour supply of the industry. By the time of our interviews, nine out of ten workers 
were still introduced to the construction sites by labour subcontractors. The feasibility 
of newly established urban labour companies being able to replace all the labour 
subcontractors and direct recruit workers in labour exchange is questionable.  
 
Unlike urban job centres, the prosperity of labour subcontractors lies in the flexibility 
they offer to workers, such as allowing them to go back home for the harvest, and 
their ability to mobilize workers from rural areas when they have not planned to come, 
which are crucial to the spells of labour shortage in cities. As a result, the removal of 
all labour subcontractors can be a great threat to the labour supply to construction 
projects. As shown by our interviews, businesses were not following the new policy. 
In the future, as commented in Xiao and Liu (2005), the urban labour companies may 
in the end have to subcontract the recruitment tasks to sub-subcontractors again. As a 
result, the system will remain largely the same except for one extra layer of 
administration.  
 
However, more effort can be made to address the core problem associated with the 
labour subcontractor system, i.e. defining a clearer employment relationship, 
rearranging the projects’ and workers’ pay system rather than writing off labour 
subcontractors. The state can overcome these problems by imposing regulations 
directly, for example, demanding formalisation of employment relationship by turning 
the subcontractors into registered employers whose licence renewal is subject to 
meeting certain conditions; or stripping labour subcontractors of the power to deliver 
the pay, and require construction companies to sign up workers directly after they are 
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introduced by labour subcontractors and take over labour management. Thus labour 
subcontractors become employees or service providers of the construction companies.  
 
At the same time, rural construction workers face risks which are common to all 
workers from rural areas. It is their rural and migrant statuses that make their lifestyle 
different from ordinary urban residents. Despite of the prevalence of self-exclusive 
behaviour, it is also important to note that lack of trust of the state and its policies has 
played at least as a big role as lack of awareness. Our research shows that if policies 
do not address the special work and life style of construction workers, they are 
unlikely to be accepted by the workers. This is partially in line with the discussion of 
so called ‘voluntary social exclusion’. As Burchardt et al. (1999)and Barry (1998) 
argued, even voluntary self exclusion can potentially be a result of “continued 
hostility in the wider society” that leads to the withdrawal of certain social group from 
the mainstream. When the inactive participation is caused by this root, then the 
solution lies in how to remove hostility and build up trust between the “self-excluded” 
social group and the society.  
 
As shown in the research, the self-exclusion from the formal social security schemes 
could also be an outcome of rational choices based on the evaluation of the benefits 
and costs the individual schemes for the poor workers.  
 
Among all the social insurance schemes, only the insurance against industrial 
accidents is solely based on employer contribution. Workers do not need to worry 
about contributing, and wherever they travel, they do not need to transfer any accounts 
to a different employer or a different place. It is furthermore straightforward to 
administrate. Although this policy suffers from a high threshold for claiming 
compensation, workers are aware of their rights; and construction companies, having 
paid for the insurance charge before the project starts, do not have incentives to 
default.  
 
On the other hand, other social insurance schemes, including pension, healthcare and 
unemployment benefits, all require workers to contribute regularly and/or have a 
formal employment relationship. Given that workers rarely sign contracts when they 
work for the labour subcontractors, when there are disputes, it is very difficult for 
workers to win. As can be expected, our interviews showed unwillingness to 
participate. There are also specific issues associated with each form of welfare. 1) 
Health care policy needs to take into account that construction workers rely heavily on 
good health. Once a worker is seriously ill, he/she will not continue to stay in the city. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that a worker will benefit from urban healthcare even if he/she 
contributes. 2) Minor injuries and illnesses, which are not considered to be major 
problems but need prolonged and regular medical care, can be heavy burdens for 
construction workers. These are not covered by the social insurance schemes. 
However, given their salary level and the frequency of their suffering of these 
problems, the current threshold (1000 Yuan in Tianjin) for benefiting from the social 
insurance schemes is very high. 3) The urban unemployment benefits also need to be 
designed to offer flexibility for workers to move between regions.  
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Therefore, it is not enough just to extend the coverage of formal social insurance to 
rural workers in cities. The social security system should consider the special needs of 
these social groups.  
 
In conclusion, some risks faced by rural workers in the construction industry are work 
related and some other risks are related to their status as rural-urban migrants. Meeting 
the work related risks demands a better understanding of how the industry works. The 
status related risks need a more integrated system which will take into account 
workers’ background and income levels, and grant flexibility to workers moving 
between employers and between cities and villages. Finally, it is also important to deal 
with the hostility and the mistrust that exits between this disadvantaged group and the 
wider society.  
 
This paper cannot offer a simple solution to the problems faced by rural construction 
workers in Chinese cities. Instead, it demonstrates the complicated interaction 
between social policies, industrial organisation and the process of rapid urbanisation, 
and thus the impossibility of solving these problems with a rapid top-down policy. It 
is unlikely that construction workers from rural areas can be effectively integrated into 
urban society if there is no social policy that is carefully designed to work with long 
term institutional changes, both at the level of the industry—construction--and at the 
level of the specific social group—rural-urban migrants. 
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Figure 1: Total Production in Construction (100 million Yuan) 
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Data Source: National Statistics Bureau of China, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
 
Figure 2: Total Number of Employees in Construction (in millions) 
 
 
Data Source: National Statistics Bureau of China, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
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Figure 3: Employment of rural labourers (millions) 
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Data Source: Ministry of Agriculture, PRC, 2005, China Agriculture Development Report, 2005, 
http://www.agri.gov.cn/sjzl/baipsh/2005.htm, Table 2. 
 
Table 1: Rural Household Employment 
  National East Middle West
Number of households surveyed 19484 6500 7396 5588
Total number of people in each household 4.00  3.89  3.88  4.28 
Number of people with rural household 
registration 3.78  3.61  3.72  4.07 
Number of people in the labour force 2.46  2.38  2.47  2.55 
 Including rural labour  2.35  2.24  2.38  2.45 
Total number of days working outside hometown 
by household members 220  212  220  229  
Total number of people working outside 
hometown in each household 0.91  0.84  0.92  0.99 
Income earning through working outside 
hometown 6014  8097  5088  4816 
Number of people working in agriculture 1.28  0.93  1.39  1.45 
number of people in manufacturing 0.27  0.41  0.24  0.17 
Number of people in construction 0.11  0.10  0.14  0.15 
Number of people in transportation 0.07  0.08  0.06  0.07 
Number of people in trade and catering 0.23  0.26  0.20  0.23 
Number of people working in other jobs 0.50  0.60  0.44  0.47 
 
Data Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 2005, China Agriculture Development Report, 2005, 
http://www.agri.gov.cn/sjzl/baipsh/2005.htm, Table 31.  
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Figure 4: The risks faced by construction workers from rural areas 
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